Name of the case: Minerva
Mills Ltd. & Others v. Union of India & Others (1980)
Court: Supreme
court of India.
Bench(Judges):
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice P.S.
Kailsam and Justice P.N. Bhagwati JJ. (5 Judges bench)
Petitioner: Minerva
Mills Ltd. & Others.
Respondent: Union
of India & Others.
Citation: AIR
1980 SC 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206.
BRIEF FACTS:
1. Minerva Mills
Ltd. (herein after referred to as the petitioner no. 1/ the Company) is a
limited company dealing in textiles inKarnataka. The other petitioners are the
shareholders in Minerva Mills.
2. August 20,
1970- The Central Government, in apprehension of the substantial fall in
production of Minerva Mills, appointed a committee under section 15 of the
Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 (herein after referred to
as the IDR Act) to make an investigation of the affairs of Minerva Mills Ltd.
3. October 19,
1971- After the submission of the committee report, the Central Government
passed order under section 18A of the 1951 Act that authorised the National
Textile Corporation Ltd., to take over the management of the Mills on the
ground of mismanagement of the company affairs. Hence, this undertaking was
nationalised and taken over by the Central Government under the provisions of
the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 (herein after
referred t as the Nationalization Act).
4. Thereafter,
the petitioners challenged this order before the High Court. The High Court,
however, dismissed their petition.
5. The
petitioners, therefore, filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
under article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
6. They
challenged the constitutionality and validity of the following;a. Sections
5(b), 19(3), 21 (read with 2nd schedule), 25 and 27, of the Sick Textile
Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 b. Order of the Central Government
dated October 19, 1971 c. Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty Second
Amendment) Act, 1976; and d. The primacy given to the Directive Principals of
State Policy over the fundamental Rights.
ISSUES
RAISED:
1.Whether
section 4 and section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976, are damaging basic
structure of the constitution or not?
2.Whether DPSP
(Part 4) is more important than Fundamental Rights (part 3) or not?
3. Whether
Judicial Review is part of basic structure or not?
ARGUMENTS
BY THE PETITIONER:
Parliament’s
power of amending the constitution is limited and there are inherent
limitations within the Constitution to limit the scope of amendment under
article 368.
The scope of
Article 368 is just to amend the constitution in a way such that there is no
change in the basic structure of the Constitution.
Though the state
is obligated by the Constitution that while making laws they have to
compulsorily look into the Directive Principles of the State
Policy[3] however, achievement of such DPSP’s is only through permissible
means. The Parliament in order to achieve DPSP’s cannot override Fundamental Rights
set out in Part III.
42nd Amendment
under section 55 strips off the affected parties there right to legal remedy
which is a basic essence of democracy. In a democratic state where laws such as
mentioned u/s 55 of 42nd Amendment are made the democracy is sure to
collapse.
Striking a
harmonious balance between the provisions of Part III & Part IV is where
justice lies and making one part subservient to another would only lead to
chaos.
There would be
no meaning to the democracy if the powers of an institution are to be made
absolute by the Constitution. To run a smooth democracy there should be checks
& balances upon each institution of the government.
There need not
necessarily be violation of Part III for fulfilment of provisions of Part IV.
ARGUMENTS
BY THE RESPONDENT:
If in course of
achieving the DPSP’s there is unintentional injury to Fundamental rights then
it cannot be said as violation of Basic Structure.
The directive
principles itself are integral for the functioning of the nation therefore,
achievement of these integral principles cannot be said as violation of Basic
structure,
Further, if any
harm is caused to the Part III provisions then it cannot be termed as violation
of Basic structure.
The parliament,
in order to achieve the hard to get goals mentioned under Part IV, must be
supreme in its sphere & there should not be any sort of limitation upon it.
Therefore, there should not be any implied or inherent limitations upon the
amending power of Parliament.
This conflict
between the hierarchy of provisions is an issue of academic interest therefore,
the courts should remain aloof of such issues.
MAJOR
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:
1.The court in
the judgment dated July 31, 1980 by majority of 4:1 held the sections 4 and 55
of the 42nd (Amendment) Act 1986.
2.Further, the
writ petition challenging the constitutionality of the Sections 5(b),
19(3), 21 (read with 2nd schedule), 25 and 27, of the Sick Textile
Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, was dismissed.
JUDGEMENT:
The court held
that the newly introduced Clause 4&5 were actually inserted to bar the
courts to entertain any challenge on the question of validity of the
constitutional amendments. The court beautifully described the importance of
Judicial Review in the following words…..Our Constitution is founded on a nice
balance of power among the three wings of the state namely the Legislature, the
Executive & the Judiciary. It is the function of the Judges nay their duty
to pronounce upon the validity of laws. The court held Section 55 of the
amendment act 1976 void since it firstly made challenge in court
impossible &secondly it removes all the restrictions on the power of
Parliament under Article 368. The court rightly interpreted the true object of
these new clauses which was to throw away the limitations imposed
by Kesavananda on Parliament.
The newly added clause 5 has the effect
of even repealing the entire constitution and change it into a totalitarian
constitution as per the political exigencies of the ruling political party
& still it won’t be a ground for a challenge in the court because of the
combined reading of Clause 4&5 of 42nd Amendment. Depriving the courts
their power of judicial review is making Fundamental Rights a box of rhetoric
dreams as they would never be granted and rights without remedies.
The court
relying on Kesavananda opined that the power to amend under Art. 368
is not a power to destroy. In the above said decision the court clearly mentioned
the scope of amendment under Article 368. The court answered about the extent
of the word “Amendment”. The court found that the word “amend” in the provision
of Article 368 stands for a restrictive connotation and could not ascribe to a
fundamental change. To understand it simply; the parliament in order to pass a
constitutionally valid amendment, the particular amendment is subject to the
application of Basic Structure test and has to pass it.
The court also
explained the relationship between the provisions of Part III & Part IV of
the Constitution. The court said that the entire Indian Constitution rests upon
the foundation of Part III & Part IV. To give absolute primacy to one over
another will be shaking the foundation of the Constitution. Striking a
harmonious balance between the provisions of Part III & Part IV is where
justice lies and making one part subservient to another would only lead to
chaos. The provisions of Part IV must be achieved but without abrogation of
FR’s and anything which shakes this balance violates the essential balance of
the Constitution. Therefore, the court in strict terms laid down that the
balance between DPSP’s & FR’s is Basic Structure of the Constitution.
As regards to
Section 4 of the amendment act 1976 which tried to separate Article 14 and 19
from Article 31 C this was held void as it destroyed the basic feature. The
articles mentioned under Article 14 and 19 are essential elementary articles n
modern democracies. Most of the recent laws are passed to satisfy the obligations
of DPSP because of which Art. 14 & 19 have stood withdrawn. These rights
are clearly without any doubt universal because of their presence in Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, restoring the judgment
of Kesavananda on the point of Art. 31 C the court struck down
Section 4 of the amendment act 1976.
Bhagwati J.
agreed with the majority in striking down Section 55 of the amendment act since
it made judicial review of the amendments impossible. In his view this
exclusion of judicial review is indirectly enlarging the scope of Parliament’s
amending capacity. Regarding Cl. 5 he wrote that it cannot remove any
doubt which did not existed. However, the amendment in Article 31 C was
held valid by him because he was of the opinion that the court should not on
first hand hold any law made under it unconstitutional. In his opinion the
courts should look into the pith of the law by following Doctrine of
Pith& Substance. If the law is substantially connected to the
provisions mentioned under DPSP’s then it would be a constitutional law and on
the contrary if there is no nexus between the law and the DPSP’s it would be
surely struck down.
Therefore, the
court by 4:1 majority held sections 4 & 55 of the 42nd Constitutional
(Amendment) Act, 1976 unconstitutional.
OBITER
DICTA:
This landmark
Judgment came on July 31, 1980. The judgment was divided into 4:1, Y.V.
Chandrachud (then CJI) writing on behalf of himself and (A.C. Gupta, N.L.
Untwalia, P.S. Kailsam JJ.) while Justice P.N. Bhagwati wrote the dissenting
opinion. The majority struck down Section 55 & 4 of the 42nd Amendment
as it was in violation of basic structure thereby upholding the Basic Structure
doctrine laid down by Kesavananda Bharti. Bhagwati J. wrote the
dissenting opinion in the sense that he agreed with the majority on the point
of striking down section 55 however he dissented with the majority on the point
of Section 4 of 42nd Amendment.
RATIO
DECIDENDI:
Section 4 and 55
of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 were struck down and the reason given was,
clause 4 under section 55 was damaging the basic structure and clause 5 barred
the judicial review. As regards to Section 4 of the amendment act 1976 which
tried to separate Article 14 and 19 from Article 31 C this was held void as it destroyed
the basic feature. These rights are clearly without any doubt universal because
of their presence in Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore,
restoring the judgment of Kesavananda on the point of Art. 31 C the
court struck down Section 4 of the amendment act 1976.
CONCLUSION:
The doctrine of
Basic Structure which was laid down in Kesavananda Bharti case, this judgemnet
was another decision where the apex court applied this doctrine. Section 55 of
the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 was struck down with the judgement given unanimously.
The debate which was going on since 1951 was finally ender after this judgement
which was the most important point of this judgement. The debate on the point
of limitation on parliament’s power in amending the constitution when it was
held that the parliament cannot amend the basic structure of the constitution.
Parliament had been indulging in proving it’s suprimacyover the democracy as
well as the institutions, since the Golaknath decision, be it in a direct or
indirect way. After the successive defeats in Golakanath, Kesavananda
Bharti & Indira Nehru Gandhi the parliament desperately amended the
Constitution and inserted a direct law claiming that there can be no limitation
on Parliament’s power of amendment as well as there can be no challenge in
courts of law on the amendments. This regressive and draconian law was passed
by parliament in order to prove its supremacy.
The court was
called upon to decide the constitutionality of such draconian law. The court without
giving any other vague interpretations or fearing the mighty government upheld
the epic Kesavananda decision. The court gave a unanimous decision
that such amendment which restricts the challenge of amendments in the courts
of law and which removes all restriction on the power of parliament are void
and violative of Basic structure of the constitution. The court held that
Judicial Review is something that they cannot take away eve with making law.
The court also
explained the relationship between the provisions of Part III and Part IV and
held that in process of achieving Part IV provisions there shall be no
abrogation of Fundamental Rights. The court justifies this proposition on the
basis that the foundation of constitution is the harmonious relation between
Fundamental Rights & Directive Principles of the State Policy. Striking a
harmonious balance between the provisions of Part III & Part IV is where
justice lies and making one part subservient to another would only lead to
chaos. The provisions of Part IV must be achieved but without abrogation of
FR’s and anything which shakes this balance violates the essential balance of
the Constitution. Therefore, the court in strict terms laid down that the
balance between DPSP’s & FR’s is Basic Structure of the Constitution.
The court also
reiterated Kesavananda’s ruling that the power of Parliament to amend
the constitution under Art. 368 is of restrictive nature. The court relied on
the description of Basic Structure by Hegde &Mukherjeajj. that only circumstantial
features can be changed and basic features cannot be changed.
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