Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India

 

Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India

NAME OF THE CASE	SHREYA SINGAL VS UNION OF INDIA
CITATION	AIR 2015 SC 1523
DATE OF JUDGMENT	24th March, 2015
PETITIONER	Shreya Singal
RESPONDENT	Union of India
BENCH/ JUDGE	J. Chelameswar, Rohinton Fali Nariman
STATUTES/ CONSTITUTION INVOLVED	Constitution of India, Information Technology Act
IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLES	Constitution of India – Article 19, Article 32 Information Technology Act –Section 66A

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

The entirety of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000 was declared unlawful by the Supreme Court of India. The petitioners claimed that Section 66A was unconstitutionally ambiguous and that the prohibitions allowed by Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution went beyond the protection it was designed to provide against annoyance, discomfort, danger, obstruction, insult, harm, and criminal intimidation. The Court concluded that there were no reasonable exceptions to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression that applied to the prohibition against the transmission of material through a computer resource or a communication device with the intent to annoy, inconvenience, or insult.It further found that because the provision failed to define terms, such as inconvenience or annoyance, “a very large amount of protected and innocent speech” could be curtailed and hence its sweep was overly broad and vague.

INTRODUCTION

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court invalidated section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which had provisions for the arrest of those who allegedly uploaded objectionable content online, protecting freedom of expression. A conviction under Section 66A carries a potential sentence of three years in prison and a fine for sending "offensive" texts by computer or any other communication device, including a mobile phone or tablet. The broadcasting of any material through a computer resource or a communication device that was "grossly offensive" or "menacing" in nature, or that, among other things, even only cause "annoyance," "inconvenience," or "obstruction" has been illegal in several circumstances during the past couple of years.In a judgment authored by Justice R.F.Nariman, on behalf of a bench comprising himself and Justice J. Chelameswar, the Court has now declared that Section 66A is not only vague and arbitrary, but that it also “disproportionately invades the right of free speech.”

In invalidating Section 66A in Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court fulfilled its duty as a constitutional court for Indians and gave free speech in that country a new lease on life. The Court has given the free speech jurisprudence an improved and uncommon clarity. It is false to claim that Section 66A has given rise to new types of crimes because several IPC provisions as well as Sections 66B and 67C of the IT Act are adequate to address all of these offences.

 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) is a significant case that has a significant impact on the Indian judicial system.
The case revolves around the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which challenged the constitutional validity of section 66A and led to the struck down of section 66A of the Information Technology Act 2000 Section 66A is the punishment for sending offensive messages through communication services, etc.

It says that- Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-

(a) any information that is egregiously offensive or menacing; (b) any information he knows to be false but is using a computer resource or a communication tool to repeatedly inflict annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will,

(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message intended to irritate or inconvenience the addressee or receiver, or to deceive or mislead them regarding the origin of such messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

For the purpose of this section, terms “electronic mail” and “electronic mail message” means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, images, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.

Facts Of the Case

Two women were arrested under Section 66A of the IT Act for allegedly posting Facebook comments expressing their displeasure about a bandh called by the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, after the death of their leader Bal Thackarey. Following public outcry, a PIL was filed challenging the constitutionality of Sec. 66A, along with other sections of the IT Act.

Contentions

Petitioners

i. The petitioner claimed that Article 19's eight subjects do not apply to Section 66A, which violates the basic right to free speech and expression (2). They claimed that Article 19 does not apply when someone causes irritation, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, animosity, hatred, or ill will (2).

ii. They further argued that their rights under Articles 14 and 21 have been violated because there is no discernible difference between those who use the internet and those who use other forms of communication, and that punishing someone for their choice of communication medium violates Article 14's prohibition against discrimination.Additionally, they said that because the phrases used in Section 66A are not specified, it is exceedingly ambiguous and permits authorities to act arbitrarily.

iii.  Numerous court rulings in favour of free speech have also been cited, including Romesh Thapar v. SO Madras, Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd. v. UoI, Bennett Coleman and Co. v. UoI, and S. Khushboo v. Kannamal and Anr., all of which discussed the value of free speech in a democracy.

State

The State contended that the Court should only intervene in the legislative process when a statute is obviously in violation of rights under section III of the Constitution since the legislature is best equipped to understand the interests of the people. A provision is presumed to be constitutional, thus the mere prospect of abuse cannot be used to invalidate it.

ii. The State also emphasised the potential for the Internet to be used to spread hatred, highlighting the absence of restrictions, accessibility, lack of consent moderation, and use of sophisticated technological techniques.

iii.The Government relied on the case of The Collector of Customs, Madras vs. Nathella Sampath Chetty and Anr. - possibility of abuse does not mean statute is invalid – constitutional validity of a statute is determined on the basis of its provisions and on the ambit of its operation, reasonably construed

Court’s Reasoning

The court cited Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Collins (man called MP's office and made references to "Pakis," "Black Bastards," "Niggers," etc.) and Chambers of Director of Public Prosecutor (man tweeted to airport "get your shit together or I will blow it sky high") to illustrate how even judicially trained minds can have wildly different opinions on what is offensive. (In both cases, courts on various levels of the appellate. After reviewing Chintaman Rao v. SO Madhya Pradesh, the Court determined that Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately intrudes upon the right to free speech and upsets the balance between the right and reasonable restraints (the term "reasonable restriction" implies that limitations imposed on rights should not be arbitrary, excessive, or beyond interests of the public).

ChillingEffect:

While considering the Chilling Effect, the Court opined that information that may be grossly offensive or which causes annoyance or inconvenience may include large parts of innocent/protected speech. Some views may be offensive to one and not so to others. Court examined 

o   R Rajgopal vs. SO TN which combined multiple US cases including the Spycatcher case, to discuss the “chilling effect” induced by threats of action, especially in situations where facts to justify a defamatory publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence is not available

o   S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal where it was held that law should not be used to have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression

o   Kamashree Prasad &Ors vs. SO Bihar: a role of Bihar Govt, Servant Conduct Rules was struck down as it imposed a strict ban on all demonstrations, innocent or otherwise.

 

 

 

Reasonable Exercise of  66A

The Court considered the government's defence when debating the claim that Section 66A can be used in an unreasonable manner. The Court concluded that if Sec 66A is unconstitutional, it cannot be protected on the grounds that the government will administer it reasonably.

Regarding the government's argument that the unconstitutional portion of Section 66A can be separated from the constitutional portion, the Court noted that it had been decided in Ramesh Thapar v. SO Madras that "where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a Fundamental Right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and outside the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right,it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable.”

Judgment

By strictly construing the acceptable justifications for limiting the right, such as upholding public order or preserving one's reputation, this ruling undoubtedly broadens the definition of free expression.

However, almost four years later, in February 2019, the Supreme Court received a new lawsuit based on evidence that the Singhal v. Union of India decision was not being properly applied. In November 2018, the Internet Freedom Foundation published a study on the continued use of the Section. The study discovered that there were 65 to 70 cases total in various legal databases and that new cases were being filed in police stations, investigated, and then taken into consideration by lower courts.The study raised concerns about the continued use of 66A, and the People's Union for Civil Liberties—one of the initial petitioners—returned to the Supreme Court in January 2019 with a request for guidance.

The application requested that copies of the Shreya Singhal ruling be distributed to all chief secretaries of states, then to directors general of police, via the proper circulars. For further distribution to the District Courts under their jurisdiction, a similar directive was requested from each High Court. Last but not least, the application asked the High Courts to issue the necessary orders in all pending 66A cases to ensure disposal

The Supreme Court allowed the request with respect to dissemination of the judgment by order dated 15.02.2019. In a blog post, advocates involved with the petition, Sanjana Srikumar and Joanne D’Cunha, discuss the litigation and the challenge of post-decisional oversight and implementation.

 

Conclusion

A two-judge Supreme Court of India panel issued its ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India in 2015 on the topic of online speech and intermediary responsibility in India. The Information Technology Act, 2000's Section 66A, which deals with restrictions on online expression, was declared illegal by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it violates the right to free speech provided by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The Court further determined that the Section was not preserved because it violated Article 19's definition of "reasonable restriction" on the right to free speech. The Supreme Court also repealed Section 79 and the Rules that follow it.It held that online intermediaries would only be obligated to take down content on receiving an order from a court or government authority. The case is considered a watershed moment for online free speech in India.

While Section 66A, which was ruled to be unconstitutional, has continued to be used as a sanction against online speech in several instances, the Supreme Court's ruling is of enormous significance for defending online free speech against arbitrary restrictions. The Delhi High Court held in the case of MySpace v. Super Cassettes that the Supreme Court's reading down of Section 79 of the IT Act, which included the requirement that a takedown notice must be approved by a court or government agency, did not apply to cases of copyright infringement under the Indian Copyright Act.