CASE
COMMENT
State
of Madras vs Champakam Dorairajan
EQUIVALENT
CITATIONS: AIR 1951 SC 226
AUTHOR:
SHEJAL SHARMA
PETITIONER: …………………………………………..“ SMT. CHAMPAKAM DORALRAJAN”
v.
RESPONDENT:………………………………………..“ STATE OF MADRAS“
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 09/04/1951
BENCH:
HIRALAL J. KANIA, C.J.;
SAIYID FAZAL ALI, J.;
M. PATANJALI SASTRI, J.;
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, J.;
VIVIAN BOSE, J.;
B. K. MUKHERJEA, J.
CITATION:
1951 AIR 226
1951 SCR 525
CITATOR INFO :
F 1954 SC 561 (14,16)
F 1958 SC 731 (12)
R 1958 SC 956 (8)
R 1959 SC 648 (26)
R 1962 SC1621 (73,108)
R 1963 SC 649 (17)
RF 1967 SC1643 (22,164,227)
E 1968 SC1379 (2)
R 1970 SC2079 (16)
RF 1972 SC1375 (81)
RF 1973 SC1461 (506,648,1704,1714,1901,1918)
RF 1975 SC 563 (13)
O 1976 SC 490 (67,69,71,159)
R 1979 SC 83 (5)
RF 1980 SC1789 (115)
RF 1985 SC1495 (8)
RF 1988 SC 305 (7)
Introduction
State of Madras v. ChampakamDorairajan is a landmark
judgment of the Supreme court of India This judgment led to the First
Amendment of the constitution of India It was the first major judgment
regarding reservations in theRepublic of India. In its ruling,
the Supreme Court upheld the Madras high court judgment, which in turn
had struck down the Government Order (G.O) passed in 1927 in the [Madras
Presidency]. The G.O provided caste-based reservation in government jobs and
college seats. The Supreme Court's verdict held that providing such
reservations violated Article 29 (2) of the Indian Constitution.
Here, the court held that Directive Principles of
State Policy have to conform to and run as a subsidiary of the Chapter of
Fundamental Rights. The chapter on Fundamental Rights was sacrosanct, and DPSPs
as in article 37 is expressly made unenforceable by a Court. Hence, cannot
override the provisions found in Part III, notwithstanding other provisions are
expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs, Orders, or directions under
article 32. DPSP can only be implemented as long as there is no infringement of
Fundamental Rights under Part III, subject to limitations to legislative and
executive powers provided under different parts of the Constitution. In Minerva
Mills’s case, a balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSP was sought.
Provisions of Law involved
Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 16 (4), 29 (2), 46—Admission to educational institutions--Executive Order fixing several seats for particular communities--Invalidity—Fundamental rightagainst discrimination on the ground of religion only—Directive principles of State policy--Value of.
Issues
1. Is the Communal G.O. issued by the State of Madras
Constitutionally valid?
2. Can a State make a reservation of seats in the
educational institutions based on caste or religion?
Facts of the case
1.
In 1950 in Madras, there existed a quota system for admission to the
colleges. The State maintained four medical colleges and four engineering
colleges.
2.
The admission in that was on the basis where for every fourteen seats, 6
were to be given to non-Brahmins, 2 to backward classes, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians
and Indian Christians, and 1 to Muslim.
3.
At that time,
the State of Madras maintained had only four Medical Colleges with a total of
330 seats Out of these seats, 17 were reserved for students coming from outside
the state and 12 for discretionary allotment by the state.
4.
Similarly, the
Madras state-maintained four Engineering Colleges, and only 395 seats were
available in those colleges. Out of these, 21 seats are reserved for students
coming from outside the state and 12 for discretionary allotment by the state.
5.
Rest of the
seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were apportioned based onthe Communal
GO of 1927.
6.
This was based
on the order issued by the Province of Madras or Madras Presidency in 1927,
before independence, which was called as Communal Government Order (Communal G. O.).
7.
The admission was based on the reservation on the ground of caste of a
person in government colleges and jobs. The State of Madras alleged that they
were allowed to maintain and enforce the Communal Government Order as under
Article 46 which is the Directive Principles of State Policy, they are entitled
to maintain the order for the promotion of the educational interest of
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and other weaker sections in the society.
8.
ShrimathiChampakamDorairajan, a Brahmin, filed a petition in the High
Court of Madras under Article 226 relating to the infringement of her
fundamental right of admission to the college.
9.
She alleged that she was not able to get admission to the Medical College despite
her scoring enough marks.
10.
ShrimathiChampakam alleged that her fundamental rights under Article 15(1)
and Article 29(2) were violated.
11.
She requested for the writ of Mandamus to be issued restraining the State
of Madras from enforcing the Communal G. O. Another petition was filed in the
High Court of Madras by C. R. Srinivasan relating to his admission to the
Engineering College.
12.
He also alleged the issue of a Writ of Mandamus. The High Court of Madras
struck down the impugned Communal Government Order as it was a caste-based
reservation and against the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the judgment of
the High Court, the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.
Contentions
Arguments
given by Petitioner
· It was stated that the entire idea of reserving seats was based on caste,
religion, and race. Article 46 of the Constitution, targets giving schooling to
the more fragile segment and the retrogressive class of the general public
society i.e. the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribes.
· This provision is stated and is counted in part IV of the
Constitution and includes certain provisions of directive state policy that are
not generally enforced by the court. Article 46 which provides education to the
weaker section also takes them towards social injustice and their exploitation
in society.
· Petitioner argued that the denial of admission into the
educational institution maintained by the state on the grounds of caste
violated her fundamental rights under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) of the
Constitution Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
Arguments
given by Respondent
· In Article 16 of the Constitution aims at providing equality
to all at all levels and with no discrimination based on caste color, creed
religion, sex, and race. It aims at equality for all in the places of
employment, education, and other services so that no one as a citizen of the
country is left untreated. All the backward class people are benefitted from
the same keeping in mind the view of the G.O communal which was formed and
favored by the respondent.
· Article 16 (4) states that nothing can prevent the state
from making laws for the reservation of the backward classes as citizens which
is the opinion of the state and the law and they can be appointed to the place
of their choice. This is the service of the state that is fulfilled under the
clause.
· It is contended that the applicants are not denied admission simply
because they are Brahmins however for an assortment of reasons, e.g., (a) they
are Brahmins, (b) Brahmins have a portion of just two seats out of 14 and (c)
the two seats have proactively been topped off by more meritorious Brahmin
up-and-comers. This might be valid such long ways as these two seats held for
the Brahmins are concerned yet this line of contention can have no power when
we come to consider the seats saved for competitors of different networks, for,
most definitely, the candidates are denied entrance into any of them not on any
ground other than the sole ground of their being Brahmins and not being
individuals from the local area parcel whom those reservations have been made.
· The State of Madras further contended that Article 46 under Part IV of the
Constitution, however not enforceable by any court of law, is key for the
administration of the nation Article 37 puts principles on the state to apply
those standards in making regulations. The state is qualified to keep up with
the Communal Go, fixing proportionate seats for various communities, and the
request is legitimate in regulation and not infringing upon the Constitution.
· In this manner, assuming an individual can't get entrance into the
instructive Institutions due to the Communal G.O, there is no encroachment of
their fundamental rights.
Observations
The Court observed that the proportion fixed in the old
communal G.O. has been adhered to even after the commencement of the
Constitution on January 26, 1950. Indeed G.O. No. 2208 dated June 16, 1950,
laying down rules for the selection of candidates for admission into the
Medical Colleges substantially reproduces the communal proportion fixed in the
old communal G.O.
The Court said that it does not appear that the petitioner had applied for
admission to that college. She states that on inquiry she came to know that she
would not be admitted to the College as she belongs to the Brahmin community.
However, the Court does not take any objection to it.
The Court observed that Article 29 clause 1 protects the language, script, or
culture of a section of the citizens, and clause 2 guarantees the fundamental
right of an individual citizen. The right to get admission into any educational
institution of the kind mentioned in clause 2 is a right that an individual
citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community. [2]
This right is not to be denied to the citizens on the ground of religion or
caste. This is only applicable to those who have the required qualification for
admission to any educational institution. Therefore, in this case, there is a
complete breach of the fundamental right.
Judgment
· The Court was of the view that the order in the Communal
G.O. given by the govt. Based on religion, race and caste is against the
Constitution and are essentially a reasonable infringement of fundamental rights.
· The Supreme Court held that the Communal o constituted an infringement of
the fundamental right ensured to the residents of India by Article 29(2) of the
Constitution and was hence void under Article 13.
· Supreme Court held that 'Provision (2) under Article 29 ensures the basic
right of a resident. The option to get admission into any educational
institution of the sort referenced in clause (2) is a right that a resident has
as a citizen and not as an individual from any local area or class of residents.
This right isn't assumed to be denied to the resident on the grounds just of
religion, race, caste, language, or any of them.
· The Supreme Court further held that the directive
principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution cannot in
any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part I.
· The Supreme Court said that the Directive Principles of State Policy,
which by Article 37 are explicitly made enforceable by a Court can't supersede
the provisions found in Part III which despite different provisions are
explicitly made enforceable by suitable Writ, Orders, or direction under
Article 32.
· Thus, the Court held that the characterization in the Communal GO proceeds
based on religion, race, and caste. The
grouping made In the Communal Co s went against the Constitution and
constitutes a clear infringement of the fundamental rights ensured to the
resident under Article 29(2), the Communal to being conflicting with the
provisions of Article 29(2) In Part II of the Constitution is void under
Article 13 Thus, it maintained the Judgment of the High Court of Madras.
Impact Of The Judgement
ChampakamDorairajan's case chose the subject of Supremacy between the
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. One of the
first cases managed the topic of reservation in admission to the educational
institution. ChampakamDorairajan’s case
along with Romesh Thappar’s case necessitated constitutional amendments. The
first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two
cases.The first amendment, among other changes, inserted Clause (4) into
Article 15.
Conclusion
This judgment proves to be of major significance as to
has been initiated as a method to distinguish when there is a conflict between
fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy. The court also
struck down the Communal Government Order that still existed even after the
Constitution was in force. That communal order was against the fundamental
right of the Constitution and was thus, declared void. Article 13 became an
operation where legislation is proved to be not in conformity with the
Constitution and was enacted before it came into force, will be struck down.
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