The AK Gopalan
vs. State of Madras
In the Supreme
Court of India
NAME OF THE CASE A.K. Gopalan V.
State Of Madras
CITATION
1950 AIR 27, 1950 SCR 88
DATE OF JUDGEMENT May 19, 1950
PETITIONER
A.K. Gopalan
RESPONDENT The
State of Madras. U.O.I: Intervener
BENCH/JUDGE Kania,
Hiralal J. (C.J), Fazl Ali, S. Shastri
M Patanjali, M.C Das, S. Ranjan, B.K.
STATUTES/CONSTITUTION Constitution of India;
Preventive
Detention Act.
IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES Constitution of India- Art. 13, 19 to 22.
Preventive Detention Act,1950.
Abstract
Communist leader A.K Gopalan had been under detention
since December 1947, since his sentencing under ordinary criminal law. Those
convictions were subsequently set aside. On 1 March 1950, while he was in
Madras jail, Gopalan was served with an order made under Section 3(1) of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The provision allows the Central Government or
the State Government to detain anyone in order to prevent them from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the national defense, foreign relations, national
security, state security, public order, or the maintenance of essential
supplies and services.
Gopalan filed a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus against his detention.
Gopalan was prohibited from disclosing the grounds under which he was detained
because of Section 14 of the Act, which prohibited such disclosure even in a
court of law. He claimed that the order detaining him violated Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Constitution and that the provisions of the Act violated Article
22 of the Constitution.
The matter was placed before a six-judge bench. M. K.
Nambiar, with S.K. Aiyar and V.G. Rao represented Gopalan. K. Rajah Aiyar, the
Advocate-General for the State of Madras, with C.R. Pattabi Raman and R.
Ganapathi represented the State of Madras. M.C. Setalvad represented the Union
of India, which was an intervener in the case.
Introduction
The AK Gopalan vs. State of Madras Case is one of the most
well-known and frequently cited cases in Indian history.
The case is famous because it was the first to be heard in the
Supreme Court of India, in which numerous articles of the Indian Constitution
were discussed, and prominence was also given to the Indian Constitution’s
chapter on Fundamental Rights.
The primary focus was on various articles, including 19, 21, and
22. The judgment, in this case, established a restrictive view of fundamental
rights, which was upheld for nearly 30 years before being overturned in “Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India.”
Even though this decision was later reversed, it influenced how
different courts viewed citizens’ and non-citizens’ fundamental rights. In a
very broad and detailed manner, without attempting to encapsulate all human
rights under the heading of fundamental rights.
The judgment provided an opportunity for the Indian judiciary to
extensively elaborate and interpret the Constitution’s fundamental rights. One
of the primary reasons the case is so well-known and well-known among cases
involving fundamental rights is because of the nonconforming judgment delivered
by “Justice Fazl Ali,” one of two dissenting judges on a six-judge bench.
The 1950 judgment of Justice Fazl Ali established a precedent for
personal liberty and a liberalized perspective on fundamental rights and
various other human rights.
FACTS OF THE CASE
AK. Gopalan was a prominent communist leader in the Madras state.
He was detained in December 1947 and imprisoned under “ordinary criminal laws,”
where he was condemned and punished.
Although the court later reversed these convictions, A. K. Gopalan
remained in detention. Later, on 1st March 1950, A. K. Gopalan was again
detained under section 31 of the Act, which grants the state and central governments
the authority to detain any person.
However, A. K. Gopalan filed a writ of “habeas corpus” against his
detention according to the provisions of the “Preventive Detention Act of
1950.” Later, A. K. Gopalan challenged the constitutionality and validity of
the order authorizing his detention, claiming that it violates various
provisions of the Indian Constitution’s fundamental rights and that act 4 of
the Madras state acts 1950 conflicts with article 22 of the Indian
Constitution.
He contested the act’s validity because it violates article 19 1’s
freedom of movement and article 21’s liberty.
ISSUES RAISED
BEFORE THE COURT
1.
Whether the Preventive Detention Act,1950
contravenes the article 13,19,21 of Indian Constitution.
2.
Whether the Procedure Established by Law
refers to “Due Process of Law”.
ARGUMENTS
In the case of “A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras,” the
greater part of judges decided that reformatory and pre-emptive confinement
fell outside the scope of “Article 19” of the Indian Constitution, and thus the
“Preventive Detention Act, 1950” did not disregard it.
The court also argued that mentioned provision, which stipulates
security to residents who are at liberty, does not apply to residents whose
opportunities are limited by regulation, and that the issue of authorizing
“Article 19(1)” does not ascend.
It was argued that under “Article 21 of the US Constitution,”
“procedure established by law” refers to “due process of law,” which
incorporates the rule of regular equity and that because the criticized law
does not meet the requirement of fair treatment of law, it is not invalid.
Different arrangements of the “Preventive Detention Act, 1950” are
enclosed under “Article 22 and those which are not, are added through the parts
of Article 21.”
The Apex law court held that “Section 3 of the Act” was
legitimized and as it was substantial to give such optional forces to the
leader, what’s more with the greater part court likewise settled upon the
legitimacy of “Section 7 and 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950” as under
“Article 2(7)(b) the parliament has not required ability to set a base
detainment period and under Article 22(5)” and 22(6) the right of portrayal
which off to be received orally are excessive.
JUDGEMENT
The majority rejected AK Gopalan’s contentions, holding that the
‘personal liberty protected by Article 21 simply means freedom from confinement
without legal authorization.
In other words, personal liberty includes independence from bodily
confinement and compulsion that is not legally permitted. When used
comprehensively, the phrase ‘liberty’ encompasses all the liberties listed in
Article 19.
The court narrowed down the definition of ‘personal liberty under
English law. Article 21 grants citizens protection from arbitrary imprisonment
(which is only partial control). Only when he is a free man, not if his liberty
is infringed by a legal measure. “As the Court observed, “established procedure
under the law” is not equivalent to “due process of law” under the US
Constitution.
Apex Court interpreted law holds that Article 21 may not mean the
same thing. As previously mentioned, the Drafting Committee of the Constitution
preferred the term “due process of law” to “procedure established by law.”
“Process established by law” entails a process advocated by the
law of the state. The Supreme Court view of due process has been extremely
imprecise. Constituent Assembly members would not have needed to do anything
different to make the same protections applicable in India.
Following State enactment, the Prevention of Detention Act
complied with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, the event was
upheld and the lawsuit was dismissed.
Justice Fazal Ali, in a concurring opinion, found that the Act was
accountable for violating Article 19. He placed a high premium on the term
“personal liberty,” which he defined as the possibility of development and
movement. Thus, any law that denies an individual his or her liberty must
satisfy the requirements of Articles 19 and 21.
Justice Fazl Ali-“There is however no authoritative
opinion available to support the view that this freedom is anything different
from what is otherwise called personal liberty. The problem of construction
regarding this right in the Constitution of Danzig is the same asin our
Constitution. Such being a general position, I am confirmed in my view that the
juristic conception that personal liberty and freedom of movement connote the
same thing is the correct and true conception, and the words used in Article
19(1)(d) must be construed according to this universally accepted legal
conception.”
CONCLUSION
This is a watershed moment. Judgment argued by a bench of six
judges in which the majority view of the situation was that article 21, which
covers methodology established by legislation, would essentially mean
state-created law.
The significance of the law is predicted, and it is said that
examining it under the standards of common equity does not require an
excessively broad grasp, as the consequences of common equity previously left
them in the dark. This choice advances from the ambiguity of the law and normal
ethics.
Teacher Hart stated that there is a connection between law and
ethics, but there is none. The court in the instance misconstrued this concept
by stating that there is a particular standard set for legislation that is
defined and legitimized by enactment.
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