CASE COMMENT: REG. v. GOVINDA
Introduction:
An
essential theory or concept under Criminal Law is the “Principle of
Concurrence”. This principle states that just an act would not lead to an
offence in general circumstances unless there is an exception to it. The Court
stressed over the significance of“Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
1860” and interpreted its meaning. This case provides an exception, i.e.,
“Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder”. The Lordship had put forth the
distinction between “Section 299” and “Section 300” of the IPC. The Court held
that the element of intention was absent. Both Section 299 and Section 300
possess the chief element of intention pertaining to causing of death.
“Section
299:A person commits culpable homicide, if
the act by which the death is caused is done(a) With the intention of causing
death;(b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death; (c) With the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.”
“Section
300:Subject to certain exceptions, culpable
homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done (1) With
the intention of causing death;(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury
as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the
harm is caused;(3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person,
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death;(4) With the knowledge that the act is so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”[1]
Facts:
Govinda,
the accused, kicked his wife and hit her many times on her back with his fists.
The injuries sustained on her back were not that critical. But, when she fell
down, Govinda kept one of his knees on her chest and hit her on the face. One
of the hits by Govinda was proved to be vicious through medical authentication and
it had a severe impact on his wife’s left eye, leading to discolouration and
contusion. Even though her skull was not ruptured, the hit resulted in
“extravasation of blood" on her brain and she passed away in a short
stretch of time thereafter.
Case
Analysis:
Petitioner's
Contentions:
The
petitioner’s skilled Counsel did not contest the idea that the Magistrate's
action on October 6, 1958, corresponded to an implicit discharge with regard to
the claimed offence under Section 322 of the IPC. Few of their complaints
against the Sessions Judge's actions were grounded on misconception or false
information about the circumstances. It was asserted that the entries in “C.R.P.
13” of 1958's docket failed to specify that the Magistrate had requested the
records, and therefore the concernas to whether a Sessions Judge is authorised
to issue an order under Section 436 of the Cr.P.C. without requesting the
records arises.
Sri
M. Lakshman Rao's argument as a representative of the petitioner was that under
the new procedure outlined in Section 251-A of the Cr.P.C. for warrant cases
initiated based on police reports, there is no inquiry but simply a trial by
the Magistrate and that any order attempting to remand such a case under
Section 436 for additional investigation can only be construed as an order for
the case’s retrial and such an order is beyond jurisdiction because the
Sessions Judge lacks the authority to order a new trial under Section 436.Additionally,
the petitioner claimed that the respondent was in no way ignorant of the
impending harm.
Respondent's
Contentions:
The
respondent argued that neither an intention to bring about death nor that the
intended physical harm was adequate in the usual course of nature to result in
death. Clauses (1) and (3) of Section 300 were mentioned by the respondent's
legal counsel.The respondent further claimed that he was unaware that the injury
of such a kind could result in the victim’s death.
Judgement:
Melvill, J.
1.
(a) under Section 299 and (1) under Section 300 demonstrate that murder is
always committed when there is an intent to kill.
2.
(c) and (4) are applicable in situations where there is not a deliberate
attempt whichresults in death or serious harm. Furious driving and firing at a
target close to a road would be examples of this interpretation. The extent of
risk to life determines whether the act qualifies as culpable homicide or
murder. If death is the most likely outcome, it is murder; if it is a likely
outcome, it is culpable homicide.[2]
3.
The main idea of (2) is that if the criminal knows that the victim is likely to
die from an injury that would not normally cause death due to a peculiar
constitution, immaturity pertaining to age or other special circumstances, then
they have committed murder. The following is the example provided in the
section: A strikes Z with the purpose to harm him even though he is suffering
from an illness that makes a blow likely to result in his death. Z perishes as
a result of the blow. Even though the strike might not have been strong enough
to kill a healthy individual in the normal order of nature, A is guilty of
murder.
4.
There are still (b) and (3) to be taken into consideration, and the conclusion
in doubtful circumstances like the one at hand must typically be based on a
comparison of these two clauses. If the intended physical harm is likely to
result in death, the crime is culpable homicide; otherwise, it is murder if the
harm is sufficient to result in death under normal circumstances. The
distinction is subtle but discernible. Similar distinctions between (c) and (4)
have already been noted. The concern is the level of likelihood or probability.
Practically, it usually resolves into a consideration of the type of weapon
being utilised.
Melvill
held that culpable homicide, not murder, is the offence in this case. There was
no malicious intent, and the physical harm was insufficient to result in death under
normal circumstances. It would not normally result in death. However, a strong
strike to the eye from a man's fist when the victim is on the ground with the
head down is unquestionably likely to result in death, either by causing a
concussion or by causing blood to spill onto the surface or inside the brain’s
substance.
He
was given a seven-year transportation term after being found guilty of culpable
homicide that did not constitute murder.
Conclusion:
Intention
is what separates culpable homicide from murder. According to Section 300 of
the IPC, a crime is said to have been committed if the intention is present. If
the element of intention is not present, Section 304 of the IPC governs as to
how the offence is handled.
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