RYLANDS V. FLETCHER
DETAILS
Court: House of Lords
Full case name: John
Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v. Thomas Fletcher
Decided: 17 July 1868
Citation(s): [1868]
UKHL 1, (1868) LR 3 HL 330
Judge(s) sitting: Lord
Cairns, LC, Lord Cranworth
FACTS
·
Rylands commissioned contractors to
build a reservoir on his land in 1860, with the intention of supplying water to
the Ainsworth Mill. Rylands did not participate in the construction process,
instead contracting it out to a qualified engineer.
·
During construction, the contractors
discovered a number of old coal mines and passages beneath the ground, which
connected to Thomas Fletcher's adjacent mine and were filled loosely with soil
and rubbish. The contractors chose to leave these shafts open rather than seal
them up.
·
Rylands' reservoir burst on December 11,
1860, shortly after being filled for the first time, flooding Fletcher's mine,
the Red House Colliery, inflicting £937 in damage.
·
Fletcher pumped the water out, but his
pump burst on April 17, 1861, and the mine began to flood again. A mines
inspector was called in at this point, and the submerged coal shafts were
located.
·
On November 4, 1861, Fletcher filed a
claim against Rylands and the landowner, Jehu Horrocks.
ISSUES
RAISED
·
Did there seem to be any annoyance?
·
Was the Defendant's use of his land
unreasonable, and hence should he be held accountable for the Plaintiff's
damages?
THE
COURT OF LIVERPOOL
This court ruled in
favour of the plaintiff on both trespass (since the flooding was not
"direct and immediate") and nuisance grounds. Later, a court order
resulted in the appointment of an arbitrator from the Exchequer of Pleas in
December 1864. The arbitrator determined that the independent contractors were
accountable for carelessness because, despite knowing about the old mine
shafts, they failed to deal with them properly. Rylands had no means of knowing
about the mine shafts, according to the arbitrator, thus he couldn't be held
accountable.
EXCHEQUER
OF PLEAS
After that, the matter
was sent to the Exchequer of Pleas. The case was considered on two points, whether
the defendants were liable for the contractors' activities, and whether the
defendants were responsible for the harm despite their lack of culpability.
They agreed that the
defendants were not liable on the first issue, but they disagreed on the second
point. Channell B withdrew his name from consideration. The defendants were not
liable, according to Pollock CB and Martin B, because there was no valid case
because a negligence claim could not be raised. Dissenting Judge Bramwell B
claimed that the claimant had the right to enjoy his land free of interference
from water from the defendant's reservoir, and that as a result, the defendant
was guilty of both trespass and nuisance commissioning. He stated that “the
general law, wholly independent of contract” should be that the defendants were
liable, “on the simple ground that the
defendants have caused water to flow into the [claimant]’s mines, which but for their actions wouldn’t have gone there…”
COURT
OF EXCHEQUER CHAMBER
Fletcher was enraged by
the three exchequer judges' decision and appealed to the exchequer chamber,
which consists of six judges. "The prior decision was overturned", by
the six judges. Fletcher. "We, the judges of the exchequer, believe that
the correct rule of law is that any person who, for his own purposes, brings on
his land anything, accumulates and keeps on the land that thing, which is
likely to cause trouble if it escapes, must keep it at his own risk, and, if he
doesn't, is clear (without need for further information), in charge of all the
damage which is that the natural effect of its egress," Blackburn J said
on behalf of all the judges Blackburn J
further said that that person can
excuse himself from the liability
by taking certain defences like –
that the escape was caused because of the plaintiff’s default; or by proving that the
escape was a consequence of the act of God” (Fordham Margaret1995)
The judges concluded
that “none of these excuses had been proven in the case”, and it was, therefore
“unnecessary to find out what another excuse would be sufficient”. The judges, in
the judgement, relied on the “basis of the liability for damages of land
through the tort of chattel of trespass, the tort of nuisance”, as well as “the
scienter action (common law rule that deals with the damages directly done by
animals to human beings)” (Duhame.org, 2009).
The Exchequer Chamber
court established a guideline for when an owner's obligation for bringing any
dangerous into his property can arise. At the same time, the court explored
some defences that could help free the defendant of liability.
Rylands was found
accountable for the damage done to the Fletcher by the Exchequer Chamber court.
The defendants owed a duty of care to the risk, according to the court, because
they were aware that if that amount of water leaked, it would be dangerous. The
defendants showed a lack of care by holding such a large amount of water on
their farm, which was an unnatural use of their land. Though it was not
dangerous at the moment, it would be dangerous if it escaped.
Rylands felt that this
was not just. He appealed to the House of Lords.
HOUSE
OF LORDS
The House of Lords
dismissed Ryland’s appeal. They agreed with the six exchequer judges but went
further to feature a limitation on the liability.
JUDGMENT
The appeal was
dismissed by the House of Lords, who concurred with the six Exchequer judges.
While speaking for the House of Lords, Lord Cairns noted that the House of
Lords agreed with Justice Blackburn's rule in the Exchequer Chamber, but added
an additional limitation on responsibility. The land from which the escape
takes place must also have been altered in a way that would be regarded
non-natural, strange, or improper. The House of Lords judgement stipulated that
the use must be "non-natural." The decision in this case was handed
out on July 17th. Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth were the only judges on the
bench in this case; Lord Colonsay was not present.
0 Comments